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Abstract: This paper attempts to find a relationship between agents’ risk
aversion and inequality of incomes. Specifically, a model is proposed for
the evolution in time of surplus/deficit distribution, and the long-time dis-
tributions are characterized almost completely. They turn out to be weak
Pareto laws with exponent linked to the relative risk aversion index which,
in turn, is supposed to be the same for every agent. On the one hand, the
aforesaid link is expressed by an affine transformation. On the other hand,
the level of the relative risk aversion index results from a frequency distri-
bution of observable quantities stemming from how agents interact in an
economic sense. Combination of these facts is conducive to the specification
of qualitative and quantitative characteristics of actions fit for the control
of income concentration.
JEL D310.
Keywords and phrases: Gini coefficient, economic inequality, income
distribution, (relative) risk aversion index, weak Pareto laws.
1. Introduction, hypotheses and main results
In recent years the debate on inequality has been vivified by the appearance
of writings that have attracted, and continue to attract, the attention of the
general public. Suffice it to mention books by Atkinson (2015), Piketty (2013),
Stiglitz (2013), along with the echo these works have found, and continue to
find, in the public opinion. See also OECD (2015). The clear message coming
from them is that inequality, far from being a necessary condition for good
economies, may represent a serious bar to a smooth running of the economics
of any community, to say nothing of a well-known experimental evidence of a
propensity to inequality-aversion along with a certain kind of social preferences
including egalitarianism. The present paper aims at answering the following
two questions, within a clearly defined framework: First, has an inequality-
averse community to resign itself to coexisting with low-level performance of
its economic system or, on the contrary, is inequality aversion conducive to
incentives suitable for reducing risk-aversion and, as a consequence, to improve
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performance of an economic system? Second, in this last case, how might feasible
political actions influence individual risk-aversion? Answering these questions is
not a mere trifle, so that we here confine ourselves to considering inequality
(concentration) in the distribution of individual s-plus, i.e., in the distribution
of the difference between total production of wealth and subsistence, where
subsistence is meant as wealth necessary to keep producers alive and cover
the long-term cost of production. The s-plus corresponds to a surplus or a
subplus (=deficit) depending on the sign of the aforesaid difference. Thus, the
present paper deals neither with the distribution of income among production
factors, nor with the consumption of basic necessities. It will be assumed that
the formation of the distribution of s-plus is determined by a large number
of contracts between agents. Any of such contracts will be characterized by
two vectors of (observable) non-negative ratios (see (2) in Subsection 1.1.3) to
incorporate the idea that, in general, the gain (both positive or negative) of each
agent is the sum of an s-plus derived from her/his initial s-plus, and of an s-plus
she/he might extract from the initial s-plus of the other party of the contract.
It is worth warning the reader that “to extract” has here to be meant in such
a way that an agent might, directly of vicariously, subsidize the other party
if this has an initial deficit, in agreement with the supposition we are dealing
with a community of agents exhibiting social preferences including altruism.
As to the notion of contract adopted in the present work, it is worth stressing
that it is quite “irregular” with respect to the almost entire impressive economic
literature on the subject. In point of fact, in modelling contracts, economists,
although they manifest a variety of discordant opinions, agree in assuming that
all agents are pure selfish persons, whose aspiration consists in maximizing a
utility function, possibly under more or less stringent constraints. Economists
indicate conditions under which equilibria can be reached, supposing that agents
are all in a position to tend towards such equilibria along ways without obstacles.
Then, it is no wonder if the reaction to every proposal of such a nature is
that such-and-such an assumption is implausible. This is often considered as
a seemingly good reason to restart with some variant of the story which is,
however, doomed to the same fate as its predecessor, with very high probability.
A few valuable hints on how to get out of this vicious circle can be found,
for example, in the work by Rodolfo Benini (1862-1956), an Italian economist,
demographer and statistician inclined to understand the fundamentals of the
socialist theory of surplus, and elaborate them according to his personal bent
towards an original inductive approach to economics. An important aspect of his
oeuvre is the analysis of the fundamental role played by the resistance capacity
of the parties to a contract in determining the splitting up of the benefits of
the ensuing exchange between the agents. To put it in a nutshell, the richer
has wider freedom in choosing between present and future goods or services,
between goods or services from the same market or from different markets,
etc.. Such a person is in general in a position to wait the “capitulation” of the
competitor, and the wait will be, in general, profitable for him. On the contrary,
who possesses scant resources cannot wait. The value she/he attaches to what
she/he can offer (she/he needs, respectively) decreases (increases, respectively)
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as the competitor delay in accepting the offer gets longer (as her/his resistance to
the lack of the requirements gets weaker, respectively). See Benini (1929, 1938).
This is enough to explain the leading role of the initial positions of agents in
determining the effects of a contract, and the consequent description of these
effects adopted in the present work, that is, in terms of mere accounting of
the aforesaid distribution of advantages as functions of the initial positions. See
next formula (2). On the basis of this naif, but realistic, stance, combined with
a few hypotheses concerning both the social evaluation of the outcomes of any
contract and the dynamics of the s-plus determined by the contracts between
agents (Subsection 1.1.3), we set about answering (Subsection 1.2 and Section 3)
the questions formulated at the beginning of these preliminary considerations.
1.1. Discussion of the main assumptions
For a better understanding of the results of the present paper a reasoned de-
scription of the leading assumptions is now made. This requires a preliminary
explanation of two concepts continuously surfacing in the rest of the paper:
First, the concentration of a transferable (statistical) character, that is, in other
terms, the inequality of its distribution among statistical units. Second, agents
risk aversion. These notions are here conceived from an operational point of view
and, then, they are recalled by means of well-defined measuring procedures in
order to verify practically any statement where these notions are mentioned.
See Bridgman (1927).
1.1.1. Concentration
The phrase “concentration of a transferable character” is used by statisticians
with the same meaning as “inequality in the distribution of that character”. Thus,
a distribution is said to be less concentrated than another one when it is more
egalitarian than the latter. These vague propositions can be made meaningful by
resorting to the Lorenz concentration function extended to arbitrary probability
distributions (p.d.’s, for short) on R, even with negative values in their support.
For the classical usual definition of such a function, see, for example, Paragraph
2.25 in Stuart and Ord (1994). As for the aforesaid extension, let F0 denote
the class of p.d. functions on R with finite expectation, deprived of the one
corresponding to the unit mass at 0, which, besides, would be of no interest
from the point of view of concentration. Then, for every F in F0, define AF to
be the p.d. function of the absolute value of any random number distributed
according to F , i.e.
AF (x) =
(
F (x) − F (−x− 0)
)
11[0,+∞)(x) (x ∈ R).
Moreover, set A−1F (t) = inf{x ∈ R : AF (x) > t} for any t in (0, 1). Writing
R(AF ) for the range of AF and M(AF ) for the expectation
∫ +∞
0
xdAF (x), the
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extension to [0, 1], by linear interpolation, of the function
R(AF ) ∋ θ 7→
1
M(AF )
∫ θ
0
A−1F (t)dt
is just the classical Lorenz concentration function of AF . In the present work, it
is used as concentration function for F in F0, denoted by ϕF . In fact, for any pair
of elements F1, F2 of F0 such that ϕF1 ≤ ϕF2 , with strict inequality for some
point of (0, 1), AF2 can be obtained from AF1 by redistributing absolute value
of s-plus from higher absolute value to lower one. With reference to the original
p.d. function, this is tantamount to saying that F2 can be obtained from F1 by
a policy of equalizing transfers. Hence, consistently with the Dalton principle
of transfers, F2 can be viewed as less concentrated than F1. See Dalton (1920)
and, for further developments, Pratt (1964), Atkinson (1970), Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1970, 1971 and 1972), Cifarelli and Regazzini (1987), Regazzini (1992).
1.1.2. Relative risk aversion index
The notion of risk aversion has been derived − by Bruno de Finetti (1906-
1985) − from the classical expected utility principle, which dates back to Daniel
Bernoulli and agrees with the axioms proposed by von Neumann and Morgen-
sten (1944). Thus, it is assumed that each individual has a utility function of
money (a strictly increasing and continuous real-valued function on R) u¯ so that
with any random gain G, having p.d. function F , it is associated a non-random
gain gˆ, equivalent to G, in the sense that
∫
R
u¯(x)dF (x) = u(gˆ).
Consider now the problem of the certainty equivalent gain for the restriction F0
of F to a small neighbourhood N0 := (x0 − ε, x0 + ε] of any arbitrary point x0
in the support of F :
F0(x) :=


0 if x < x0 − ε
F (x)− F (x0 − ε)
F (x0 + ε)− F (x0 − ε)
if x0 − ε ≤ x < x0
1 if x ≥ x0 + ε
Then, the certainty equivalent gain gˆ0 of a random gain distributed according
to F0 has to satisfy ∫
N0
u¯(x)dF0(x) = u¯(gˆ0).
By an elementary estimation of the first member, which becomes better and
better as ε decreases, one has
u¯(gˆ0) +
∫
N0
(x− gˆ0)u¯
′(gˆ0)dF0(x) +
1
2
∫
N0
(x− gˆ0)
2u¯′′(gˆ0)dF0(x) ≃ u¯(gˆ0)
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or, equivalently,
∫
N0
(x− gˆ0)dF0(x)∫
N0
(x − gˆ0)2dF0(x)
≃ −
u¯′′(gˆ0)
2u¯′(gˆ0)
≃ −
u¯′′(x0)
2u¯′(x0)
=: Iu¯(x0).
It is easy to interpret the right hand side as a local risk aversion index. Indeed,
one can rewrite the above equation as
m0 − gˆ0
σ20 + (m0 − gˆ0)
2
=
λu¯(x0)
x0
where m0 :=
∫
N0
xdF0(x), σ20 :=
∫
N0
(x−m0)
2dF0(x) and
λu¯(x0) := −x0
u¯′′(x0)
2u¯′(x0)
. (1)
Hence, one gets
m0 − gˆ0 =
x0 ±
√
x20 − 4σ
2
0λ
2
u¯(x0)
2λu¯(x0)
.
For the most commonly adopted utility functions u¯, λu¯(x0) turns out to be
bounded from above by a suitable constant. Combination of this fact with the
obvious inequality σ20 ≤ 4ε
2, yields
√
x20 − 4σ
2
0λ
2
u¯(x0) ≃ |x0| for sufficiently small
ε. Then, since |m0 − gˆ0| ≤ 2ε, there is only one admissible value for m0 − gˆ0,
that is
m0 − gˆ0 =
x0 − sign(x0)
√
x20 − 4σ
2
0λ
2
u¯(x0)
2λu¯(x0)
which gives
gˆ0 = m0 −
x0 − sign(x0)
√
x20 − 4σ
2
0λ
2
u¯(x0)
2λu¯(x0)
.
A straightforward computation implies that
∂gˆ0
∂λu¯(x0)
is non-positive [non- neg-
ative, respectively] whenever x0 is positive [negative, respectively]. Finally, re-
calling that λu¯(x0) = x0Iu¯(x0), the previous argument shows that the certainty
equivalent gˆ0 decreases as Iu¯(x0) increases, justifying the interpretation of Iu¯(x0)
as a measure of risk aversion. Thus, positive (negative, respectively) values for
Iu¯(x0) indicate that agents who own an s-plus x0 are risk averters (risk lovers,
respectively). The idea of measuring risk aversion through Iu¯(x0) goes back to de
Finetti (1952), as mentioned at the beginning of this subsection, and explained,
e.g., in the paper by Regazzini and Spizzichino (2011) that we are using here for
the presentation of the subject. Since λu¯(x0) is dimensionless, while Iu¯(x0) has
dimension (money)−1, it is sometimes useful, and it will be done in the present
paper, to adopt the former as an index for risk aversion, rather than the latter,
and to name λu¯(x0) relative risk aversion index (relative r.a.i., for short). See
de Finetti (1952), Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965).
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1.1.3. Description of the assumptions
As for the description of the main assumptions, one starts by supposing there
is a distinguished social welfare function derived, for example, from a common
consensus, or from an authority democratically elected. Then, the aforesaid
assumptions can be partitioned into three groups: The first are relative to the
exchange of s-plus. The second regard the formation of the welfare function. The
third concern the dynamics of the joint distribution of s-plus in a population of
N agents.
As far as the first group is concerned, exchanges between two agents are
described through the quantification of the variation occurring in each agent’s
s-plus because of the exchange, assuming that one can split this variation into
two components: the former resulting from the investment of the s-plus initially
owned by her/him, the latter thought of as a function of the initial s-plus of the
counterpart. Moreover, one supposes that each agent is: first, cautious enough
to exclude contracts in which the absolute value of a possible negative variation
due to the investment of an initial surplus would be greater than the aforesaid
surplus, second, not so able to transform an initial subplus into a profit with-
out the intervention of a cooperative counterpart, third, sufficiently altruist to
possibly subsidize a counterpart having an initial subplus. This is tantamount
to stating that each of the two components of any final s-plus is either zero or
has the same sign of the corresponding generating initial s-plus. For the sake of
generality, it will not be imposed that the advantage (disadvantage) of one of
the two contracting parties has to correspond to a disadvantage (advantage) of
the same amount for the other one. Translating these considerations into sym-
bols, one denotes the initial s-plus of the two contracting parties, say I and II,
by v and w, respectively, and the corresponding final s-plus by v′ and w′. Then,
v′ = AI+BI, w′ = AII+BII, where: AI (AII, respectively) is the s-plus I (II, re-
spectively) extracts from her/his own initial s-plus v, and BI (BII, respectively)
is the s-plus I (II, respectively) extracts from II (I, respectively). Now, in order
to express a sort of dependence of the A’s and B’s on the initial s-plus, accord-
ing to the aforesaid initial aims, one can resort to the representation AI = lIv,
AII = lIIw, BI = rIw, BII = rIIv, by introducing suitable coefficients l’s and r’s
in an obvious manner, and get
v′ = lIv + rIw
w′ = rIIv + lIIw.
(2)
The coefficients l, r’s must be non-negative in view of the assumptions made
above. In any population of contracting agents, at a given time, there will be a
variety of pairs (l, r). It is useful to organize all the observed pairs (l, r) in the
form of a statistical distribution (of frequencies) τ to be used, if necessary, for
evaluating the probability of observing a pair (l, r) satisfying any given condition
of interest. Thus, τ can be seen as a probability law assessed by resorting to
a feasible statistical survey. As a matter of fact, in the model we are about to
propose, with reference to any observable, but not yet observed, contract, each
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encounter between agents will be characterized by means of the non-negative
pairs (lI, rI), (lII, rII), thought of as realizations of two random vectors (l˜I, r˜I),
(l˜II, r˜II), with τ as common p.d.. A realistic way of thinking of τ is that it is
presentable as a mixture of frequency distributions, all of which is associated
with a specific type of interactions, weighted with the frequency of each of
these types within the population under study. It is worth recalling that (2)
is reminiscent of kinetic modelling for wealth distribution, like, for example,
in Draˇgulescu and Yakovenko (2000), in Chapter 5 of Pareschi and Toscani
(2014), and in Ajmone Marsan et al. (2016) for modelling of the same type with
applications to a more extensive field of phenomena. For more specific literature,
see: Angle (1986, 2006) for the connection between the surplus theory and the
inequality process; Chakraborti and Chakrabarti (2000) where the concept of
“saving propensity” is introduced; Cordier et al. (2005) for a model of economy
involving both exchanges between agents and speculative trading.
In comparison with this literature, the novelty of the present work lies in the
proof of a strict relationship between attitude towards risk and inequality in the
distribution of individual s-plus. Such a relationship, as explained in Section 4,
enlightens plans of actions in order to reduce inequality, simultaneously with a
tendency for an economic system to high-level performances.
The following are a few illustrative examples of the use of scheme (2).
Example 1. This example explains how to apply the general scheme (2) to the
case of public services. Let I indicate the user of a given public service and II its
supplier. Here one assumes that II receives from the State an endowment lower than
the real cost (w < 0), so that one can think of the fare to be paid by I as sum of
two amounts: the former, say f1 > 0, proportioned to w, i.e. f1 = f1(w) > 0; the
latter, denoted by f2 = f2(v) could take also negative values when v is negative and
the policy of II is that of favouring users under the poverty line. Whence, I’s s-plus
passes from v to v′ = v − f1(w) − f2(v), that can be written according to scheme
(2) with AI = v − f2(v) and BI = −f1(w) provided that v − f2(v) has the same
sign of v, for every v. On the other side, II’s s-plus w passes to w′ = AII + BII with
AII = w + f1(w) and BII = f2(v) + g1(v)1 {v<0}, where w + f1(w) < 0 whenever
w < 0 and g1(v) ≥ 0 for every v < 0 stands for an extra endowment II receives for
each user under the poverty line, whenever II puts the aforesaid policy in practice.
Representation (2) is obtained by putting lI = (v − f2(v))/v, lII = (w + f1(w))/w,
rI = −f1(w)/w, rII = (f2(v) + g1(v)1 {v<0})/v.
Example 2. This example is concerned with a market of consumer goods, in which
a buyer I with an initial surplus v enters into a contract with a seller II. The price of
a good can be thought of as the sum of two amounts: a base price q (understood as
the minimum of the prices II considers as admissible) and an additional quantity f1
depending both on the ability of II to negotiate and on I’s initial surplus. In order to
schematize this distinction according to (2), one considers f1 as dependent only on v.
Hence, v passes to v′ = v − (q + f1(v)) that is BI = 0 and AI = v − f1(v) − q, where
the RHS is assumed to have the same sign of v. As for the seller, her/his s-plus w
changes into w′ = w + f1(v) + f2(w) where f2(w) stands for the gain II realizes from
the difference between q and the cost she/he has to pay to supply the good. Thus,
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BII = f1(v) and AII = w+ f2(w), where the RHS is assumed to have the same sign of
w.
Example 3. In this example, let I be the holder of bonds which give her/him the
right to receive periodic interests, for n periods, at a fixed interest rate. If V stands for
the present value of the periodic interests, v passes to v′ = AI +BI where AI = v+ V
and BI might be strictly positive only for special types of bonds, which, for instance,
might pay a premium related to the surplus w of the issuer II: BI = rIw. On the other
side, w passes to w′ = w − V1 where V1 is given by the sum of V and the possible
premium, provided that AII = w − V1 = lIIw has the same sign of w.
The second group of hypotheses concern the welfare function involved through-
out the rest of the paper. In econophysical literature, an explicit use of utility
functions is made, for example, in Toscani et al. (2013). First of all, one assumes
that the joint welfare function of two agents, I and II as usual, is strongly addi-
tive in every contract and at every time. Whence, the joint welfare function in a
contract is the sum of the individual utility functions of each of the two agents.
Moreover, here it is assumed that the individual utility function, say U , is the
same for every agent. Since in every contract made in accordance with (2) each
agent’s s-plus changes into the sum of two gains (given by (Ai, Bi) for agent i,
i = I, II) drawn from two different sources, respectively − both expressed in the
same money of account − the function U is thought of as a real-valued func-
tion on R2. Here, the above different sources are viewed as independent, that is,
according to a definition due to de Finetti (1952a, 1952b), the two averages
1
2
(
U(A,B) + U(A+ a,B + b)
)
and
1
2
(
U(A,B + b) + U(A + a,B)
)
are supposed to be equal for every (A,B) and (a, b). This, in its turn, implies
that there are functions u1, u2 such that
U(A,B) = u1(A) + u2(B).
At this stage, by a further assumption, one supposes that the functions u1
and u2 are identically equal to a distinguished utility function of money u¯, i.e.
u1 ≡ u2 ≡ u¯. Assuming that the relative r.a.i. (recall Subsection 1.1.2 and, in
particular, (1)) is equal to a constant λ < 1/2 for every agent, one gets
u¯(x) = |x|1−2λsign(x) (x ∈ R)
provided that u¯(0) = 0 and u¯(1) = 1. This last proviso is not restrictive, since
affine transformations of any utility function of money do not alter conclusions
deducible from the use of the corresponding utility index. At this stage, the
collective (positive or negative) contribution of each contract is measured by
the expectation of the increment ∆ of the above-defined joint welfare function,
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that is
E(∆) =
∫
[0,+∞)4
[(
(U(lIv, rIw)− U(v, 0)
)
+
(
U(lIIw, rIIv)− U(w, 0)
)]
T (dlIdrIdlIIdrII)
where T is a specific joint p.d. for (l˜I, r˜I, l˜II, r˜II), consistent with the assumption
that (l˜I, r˜I) and (l˜II, r˜II) are identically distributed with common p.d. τ . Hence,
a straightforward computation yields
E(∆) =
(
|v|1−2λsign(v) + |w|1−2λsign(w)
) ∫
[0,+∞)2
(l1−2λ + r1−2λ − 1)τ(dldr).
Now, to complete the picture it is worth lingering over the classes of the ad-
missible p.d.’s τ and of the admissible values for the relative r.a.i. λ, respectively.
With a view to this subject, it is useful to notice that the function
[0,+∞) ∋ p 7→ S(p) :=
∫
[0,+∞)2
(lp + rp)τ(dldr) − 1 (read 00 := 1)
is convex. Without real loss of generality, one assumes that τ is non-degenerate,
so that S turns out to be strictly convex. This leads to distinguish two cases,
i.e., S(p) ≥ 0 for every p, or S(p) < 0 for some p. In the former, the expectation
of the increment of the joint welfare function, that is
(
|v|1−2λsign(v) + |w|1−2λsign(w)
)
S(1 − 2λ),
is positive or negative depending on whether the initial joint utility is positive
or negative, but independently of the variation of (1 − 2λ). In the latter, S(p)
admits one or two distinct zeros, and any sufficiently small deviation of (1− 2λ)
from each of them causes an increase or a decrease in the initial joint utility de-
pending on the direction of the deviation itself. Since the former is tantamount
to admitting there is no feasible action to avoid rich getting richer and poor
getting poorer, it is sensible to assume that an economy open to altruism re-
fuses as inadmissible every τ leading to the first of the two cases just described.
As an example, look at the situation illustrated in Example 1, where even the
encounter between two agents with subplus might produce positive increments
of their joint utility. Whence, from now on, τ will be any p.d. allowing S(p) to
be strictly negative for some p, and (1− 2λ) to be a zero of S. In the presence
of two distinct zeros for S, there is a further reason to assume that the com-
mon agents relative r.a.i. is just the one corresponding to the smallest of them,
since adopting the relative r.a.i. connected with the greatest zero would imply
that the unit mass1 at zero is the only admissible long-time p.d., and suffice it
to notice that such a unit mass would correspond to the unrealistic perfectly
1Recall that a p.m. m is said to be the unit (or point) mass at some x0 if m{x0} = 1. The
unit mass at any x0 is denoted by δx0 throughout the rest of the paper.
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egalitarian distribution for s-plus. The technical explanation of this statement
is deferred to Subsection 5.2, but a clue as to this fact can be drawn from a
simple comparison of the situations corresponding to the two different zeros. It
is interesting to notice that, passing from the smallest zero to the greatest one
is accompanied by a decrease in the relative r.a.i., which amounts to a decrease
(increase, respectively) in the risk aversion of surplus (subplus, respectively)
holders. For this last fact, recall the relationship λu¯(x) = xIu¯(x) in Subsection
1.1.2. In view of this equality, it is worth noticing that, on the one hand, (posi-
tive) values of λ close to 1/2 are associated with a strong risk aversion (strong
risk propensity, respectively) for those agents who own a surplus (subplus, re-
spectively). On the other hand, for negative λ’s whose absolute value becomes
bigger and bigger, holders of surplus (subplus, respectively) are more and more
risk lovers (risk averters, respectively).
As already announced, the third and last group of hypotheses concern the
dynamics − from a probabilistic viewpoint − of the s-plus of the N agents
constituting the economy of interest. Assume that the N s-plus form, as time
evolves, a pure jump Markov process with state space RN , or, more precisely, a
Markov process with paths in D([0,+∞);RN), the Skorokhod space of cadlag
functions taking values in RN . Moreover, suppose that the initial joint p.d. of the
N s-plus makes them independent and identically distributed (i.i.d., for short)
and that the generator is defined on the bounded and continuous functions
ϕ : RN → R by
ϕ 7→
1
N − 1
∑
1≤i6=j≤N
1
2
∫
R2
[
ϕ(v1, . . . , vi + h, . . . , vj + k, vN )
− ϕ(v1, . . . , vN )
]
η˜(dhdk; vi, vj)
where η˜ is the measure on R2 defined by
η˜(A×B; vi, vj) = T
(
{(li, ri, lj , rj) ∈ R
4 : (li − 1)vi + rivj ∈ A,
(lj − 1)vj + rjvi ∈ B}
)
for every Borel subsets A and B of R. Roughly speaking, this generator could
be derived from the following hypotheses: (i) agents interact two by two, (ii) the
evolution of every s-plus is driven by the same probability law, (iii) transition
probabilities depend on the form (2) of the contract determining the jump. The
conjunction of all these elements produces the joint p.d. LN,t of the N s-plus
at each time t > 0 and, in particular, the marginal distribution of each s-plus,
which is the law of actual interest to the present study. Here, this marginal p.d.
is investigated by assuming that the number N of agents goes to +∞. In view
of Theorem 3.1 in Graham and Méléard (1997), one has: For every t, all the
one-dimensional marginal laws of LN,t are identical, say L
(1)
N,t, and there exists
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a probability measure (p.m., for short) µt on R such that
sup
{∣∣∣L(1)N,t(A) − µt(A)
∣∣∣ : A is any Borel subset of R
}
≤ 6
eT − 1
N − 1
for fixed T > 0 and t < T . As a consequence of this, µt can be viewed as s-plus
p.d. of any randomly chosen agent, at time t, in an economy of infinitely many
agents (N → +∞). With a view to the study of this p.d., it is important to
recall that it turns out to be the unique solution to a distinguished Cauchy
problem, for t in [0, T ). Assuming that the number of agents N is a function
of T , say N = N(T ), increasing to +∞ as T → +∞ (reminiscent of the fact
that time can be measured in encounters between agents) in such a way that
eT /N(T ) → 0, the aforesaid Cauchy problem can be extended to every t > 0,
yielding
The limiting (as N → +∞) s-plus law µt satisfies the Cauchy problem

∂
∂t
∫
R
ψ(v)µt(dv) =
∫
R
ψ(v)Q+(µt)(dv) −
∫
R
ψ(v)µt(dv)
(t ≥ 0, ψ ∈ Cb(R;R))
µ0+ = µ0
(3)
where µ0 is the initial p.d. and Q
+(µt) the p.m. satisfying∫
R
ψ(v)Q+(µt)(dv) :=
∫
R2
∫
R2
ψ(lv + rw)µt(dv)µt(dw)τ(dldr)
for every ψ in the class Cb(R;R) of the bounded and continuous functions
from R into R.
This equation has been studied extensively in Bassetti et al. (2011) followed
by Bassetti and Ladelli (2012), Bassetti and Perversi (2013) and Perversi and
Regazzini (2015), especially w.r.t. the asymptotic behaviour of µt, as t goes to
infinity.
At this stage it is worth condensing the whole previous reasoning into the
following formal hypotheses:
(H1) For any couple of agents, say I and II, the increment of the joint welfare
function due to the interaction is
|v|1−2λ
(
l1−2λI + r
1−2λ
II − 1
)
sign(v) + |w|1−2λ
(
l1−2λII + r
1−2λ
I − 1
)
sign(w)
for every initial s-plus v and w of I and II, respectively.
(H2) τ is any p.d. such that S changes sign in (0,+∞), and the relative r.a.i. λ
is the number for which 1−2λ coincides with the smallest root of S(p) = 0.
(H3) In the rest of the paper, one considers the solution µt of (3) as p.d. of the
s-plus of an agent randomly drawn from a population of a great number of
agents.
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Remark 1. It is worth mentioning that a p.d. τ with the characteristics ex-
pressed in (H2) always exists, for example any τ with topological support in-
cluded in [0, 1]2. Such a τ is consistent with a typology of contracts in which,
according to (2), the absolute value of the s-plus Ai [Bi, respectively], i = 1, 2,
drawn from the investment of agent i’s s-plus [drawn from the counterpart’s
s-plus, respectively] is smaller than the absolute value of the initial agent i’s
[counterpart’s, respectively] s-plus. On the contrary, if the support of τ contains
also values greater than 1, it is possible to find conditions under which the va-
lidity of (H2) is assured. For example, one can argue in the following terms. On
the one hand, a positive relative r.a.i. λ is consistent with the assumption that
ml :=
∫
R
lτ(dldr) and mr :=
∫
R
rτ(dldr) satisfy mpl + m
p
r ≤ 1 for some p in
(0, 1], which entails 1 − 2λ ≤ p. On the other hand, a negative relative r.a.i. is
consistent with the assumption that ml +mr > 1 and
(σ2l +m
2
l )
p/2 + (σ2r +m
2
r)
p/2 ≤ 1
where σ2l := V ar(l˜), σ
2
r := V ar(r˜) and p is some number in (1, 2]. In fact, in
any framework of this kind, it is easy to check that 1 < 1− 2λ ≤ p holds.
Remark 2. It is important to stress the fundamental role played by the shape
of τ in determining the value of the r.a.i. and, as we shall see in a while, in
determining the level of inequality in the (stationary) distribution of s-plus.
Finally, it is worth reaffirming that the shape of τ can be modified by actions
of economic policy either regulating or influencing the market ratios (l, r).
1.2. Main results: An informal presentation
The main results of the present study pertain to the characterization of the
steady states for the s-plus distribution and to the analysis of the possible ex-
isting connections between concentration of steady states and the values of the
relative r.a.i. λ. It is worth recalling that a p.m. µ is said to be a steady (equi-
librium) state for (3) if, taking µ0 = µ entails µt = µ for every t > 0. Since, in
the present framework, the class of steady states turns out to be the same as
the one of (weak) limits of solutions of (3), as t→ +∞ (see Fact 3.1), the main
results of the present paper can be briefly summarized as follows:
(a) In order to reach a steady state for the distribution of the s-plus, it is
necessary that the initial p.d. µ0 be weak Pareto (see next Section 2 for
some remarks on weak Pareto laws) of exponent (1 − 2λ), where λ is the
value of the relative r.a.i. for every agent, −1/2 < λ < 1/2, and that the
mean of µ0 is equal to zero, whenever it is finite (see next Fact 3.2 in
Section 3). The mean is obviously finite whenever 1− 2λ > 1, i.e., in the
case corresponding to common empirical evidence on the tails of observed
income distributions. It is worth stressing that, in view of the relationship
λu¯(x) = xIu¯(x), inequality 1 − 2λ > 1 is satisfied if and only if holders
of surplus are risk lovers, on the contrary of holders of subplus, who turn
out to be risk averters.
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(b) For every initial datum like in the previous point, the long-time s-plus p.d.
µ∞ (i.e., the weak limit of µt, as t→ +∞) is weak Pareto preserving the
exponent (1−2λ). See Facts 3.3,3.4 in Section 3. Moreover, if 0 ≤ λ < 1/2,
then µ∞ is maximally concentrated, whilst, if −1/2 < λ < 0, the measure
of inequality in µ∞ decreases as (1 − 2λ) increases. Apropos of this, see
Fact 2.2 and Proposition 2.1 Section 2.
(c) According to next Fact 3.5 in Section 3, if the relative r.a.i. λ belongs to
(−1/2, 0) and the weak Pareto initial p.d. has exponent α in (0, 2), then
µt tends towards the egalitarian s-plus distribution (at zero) whenever
α > 1−2λ, whilst, for values of α smaller than 1−2λ, the unit probability
mass distributed according to µt, at time t, escapes to ∞, as t→ +∞.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the definition of
weak Pareto law and deals with the problem of how to measure its concentration
according to the notion of Gini’s index given in Subsection 1.1.1. The subsequent
Section 3 contains a precise formulation of the above results. Section 4 deals
with a few implications of those results, with a view to their fitness for political
action. Section 5 concludes the paper with technical details concerning the proofs
of propositions stated in Sections 2 and 3.
2. Some remarks on weak Pareto laws
Following Mandelbrot (1960), a p.m. piα on R is said to be a weak Pareto law
of exponent α > 0 if
lim
x→+∞
xαpiα(−∞,−x] = c1, lim
x→+∞
xαpiα(x,+∞) = c2 (4)
with c1 + c2 > 0. This section aims at supplying an interpretation of α as a
measure of concentration w.r.t. the perfectly egalitarian distribution, according
to the remarks made in Subsection 1.1.1. First, notice that, in the subclass of
F0 containing the strict Pareto p.d. functions F defined by
dF (x) = 11[x0,+∞)(x)
αxα0
xα+1
dx (x > x0) (5)
with x0 > 0 and α > 1, the partial ordering induced by the Lorenz curve
becomes total and is simply directed by the exponent α: The concentration
curve of (5) reads
ϕF (θ) = 1− (1 − θ)
1−1/α (θ ∈ (0, 1))
so that it is plain to check that it increases, i.e. economic inequality decreases, as
α increases. By the way, Benini (1908) was the first to notice this fact. Something
similar to this holds true for the entire class of weak Pareto laws. In fact, using
p.d. functions and their corresponding p.m.’s symbols interchangeably, one has
Proposition 2.1. Let piα1 and piα2 be p.m.’s on R such that
lim
x→+∞
xαipiαi(−∞,−x] = c
−
i , limx→+∞
xαipiαi(x,+∞) = c
+
i
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with c−i + c
+
i > 0 for i = 1, 2, and 1 < α1 < α2 < 2. Then, there is a suitable θ
in (0, 1) such that
ϕpiα1 (θ) ≤ ϕpiα2 (θ)
holds true for every θ in (θ, 1).
The proof is deferred to Subsection 5.1.
The last proposition can be used to justify the adoption of any strictly de-
creasing function of α, taking values in [0, 1], as a measure of the concentration
within the family of the weak Pareto laws with α > 1. In fact, apart from
the connection with the behaviour of the function ϕF associated with (5), one
ought to recall Herzel (1968), where a few concentration indices are defined on
the basis of the slope of ϕF in small neighbourhoods of 0 and 1, respectively. For
α in (0, 1], the following argument is conducive to consider the corresponding
weak Pareto law as maximally concentrated. Indeed, let Fα be the p.d. function
associated with piα and F
(ω)
α be the conditional restriction of Fα to (−ω, ω), for
any ω for which (−ω, ω) is charged by Fα. Define A
(ω)
Fα
to be the corresponding
p.d. function of absolute values, that is,
R ∋ x 7→ A
(ω)
Fα
(x) =
AFα(x ∧ ω)
AFα(ω)
.
As to the corresponding concentration function ϕ
F
(ω)
α
, in Subsection 5.1 the
following fact will be proved.
Fact 2.2. If α belongs to (0, 1], then
lim
ω→+∞
ϕ
F
(ω)
α
(θ) = 0
for every θ in (0, 1).
Hence, looking at ϕ
F
(ω)
α
as an approximation of ϕFα , for large values of ω −
as a consequence of the fact that A(ω)Fα , in its turn, is an approximation of AFα
− one can consider the weak Pareto p.d.’s piα with 0 < α ≤ 1 as maximally
concentrated from Gini’s index viewpoint.
In view of the aims of the present paper, it is not necessary to define any
specific concentration index, since the main conclusions will depend on one of
the following three relations: α = 1 − 2λ, α > 1 − 2λ, α < 1 − 2λ, α being
the exponent of a weak Pareto law describing the initial datum µ0 in (3). For
reasons that will be explained very soon − but that can be easily deduced
from Subsection 1.2 − an economic situation is called conservation-oriented or
egalitarianism-oriented or inequality-oriented, depending on which of the above
three relations is satisfied.
3. Precise formulation of the main results
This section is devoted to the complete formulation of the main results already
expounded in Subsection 1.2. In point of fact, our role is limited to rearranging,
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in a form suitable for the present setting, a few well-known propositions proved
in Bassetti et al. (2011), Bassetti and Perversi (2013) and Perversi and Regazzini
(2015). It is worth recalling that the limit µ∞ of the solution µt of (3), as
t → +∞, is meant in the sense of weak convergence of p.m.’s: µt converges
weakly to the p.m. µ∞ on R if µt(−∞, x] → µ∞(−∞, x] at each x such that
µ∞{x} = 0. It is useful to notice the following preliminary statement, to be
proved in Subsection 5.3.
Fact 3.1. If a p.d. is a steady state for (3), then there exists an initial p.d. for
which the corresponding solution µt of (3) converges weakly, as t→ +∞, to the
above steady state. Conversely, if, for a given initial datum, µt converges weakly
to a p.d., then such a limiting p.d. is a steady state.
Therefore, characterizing equilibria is equivalent to characterizing the limits
of solutions of (3) as initial data µ0 vary. As to the existence of steady states,
there is an economic literature in which the existence of steady states is guar-
anteed independently of the form of the initial data but no analytical definition
of those states is supplied. On the contrary, there are models allowing perfectly
specified equilibria sometimes obtained in the presence of particular initial p.d.’s.
Coming back to the framework stated in Subsection 1.1.3, one is faced with an
intermediate situation, that is, convergence of µt occurs only in the presence
of a distinguished class of initial data µ0 − essentially, the class of the weak
Pareto laws − and the steady states are completely determined in the form of
their Fourier-Stieltjes transforms. These statements, derived from Theorems 1
and 4 in Perversi and Regazzini (2015), are condensed into the following
Fact 3.2. Assume (H1)-(H2) are in force together with the extra conditions that
the marginal p.d.’s of τ are continuous (6)
and that
every open disk centred at any point (x, y) ∈ [0,+∞)2,
for which x1−2λ + y1−2λ = 1, has strictly positive τ-probability.
(7)
Then, in order that the solution of (3) converge, as t→ +∞, to a steady state,
it is necessary that one of the following conditions hold true:
(a) The relative r.a.i. λ is smaller than −1/2 and, at time zero, the total
income reduces to the subsistence level (that is, µ0 is the point mass at 0).
(b) The relative r.a.i. λ is equal to −1/2 and, at time zero, the distribution of
s-plus has zero mean and finite variance σ20 .
(c) The relative r.a.i. λ belongs to (0, 1/2) and the distribution at time zero
is weak Pareto (according to (4)) with exponent α = 1− 2λ.
(d) The relative r.a.i. λ is equal to 1/2 and the distribution at time zero is
weak Pareto with exponent α = 1 and c1 = c2 in (4).
(e) The relative r.a.i. λ belongs to (−1/2, 0) and the distribution at time zero
is weak Pareto (according to (4)) with zero mean and exponent α = 1−2λ.
E. Perversi and E. Regazzini/ 16
Remark 3. As far as the extra conditions (6) and (7) are concerned, they play
a mere technical role, that can be noted in the proofs of Theorems 1, 2, 4 and 5
in Perversi and Regazzini (2015). In any case, the meaning of (6) is clear, while
(7) is automatically satisfied whenever the increment ∆ (and not only E(∆)) of
the joint welfare function is equal to zero in every contract.
Remark 4. It is noteworthy that, according to Fact 3.2, if the expectation of µ0
is finite, then it must be equal to zero. This is reminiscent of a status of things
in which surplus balance subplus, in mean. This comment can be improved by
resorting to the argument, used in Subsection 3.3 of Perversi and Regazzini
(2015), entailing that, as t→ +∞, the law µt tends to concentrate on (a,+∞)
[(−∞,−a), respectively], for every a > 0, whenever the aforesaid expectation is
strictly positive [negative, respectively].
At this stage, one can state the form of the limiting steady states, which
turn out to be scale-mixtures of stable laws. The appearance here of stable laws
is not accidental. In fact, on the one hand, a link can be established between
the central limit theorem and the convergence of the solution µt of problem (3)
− see Subsection 5.2 − and, on the other hand, it is well-known that stable
laws are limiting laws of normed sums of i.i.d. random numbers. Unfortunately,
closed forms for stable laws g are known in only a very small number of cases,
but there is an explicit expressions for their Fourier-Stieltjes transforms gˆ, that
is
R ∋ ξ 7→ gˆ(ξ;α, χ, kα, γ) = exp
{
iχξ − kα|ξ|
α
(
1− iγ
ξ
|ξ|
ω(ξ, α)
)}
, (8)
where α, γ, χ, kα are constants (kα ≥ 0, 0 < α ≤ 2, |γ| ≤ 1, with the proviso
that γ = 0 if α = 2) and
ω(ξ, α) = tan(piα/2) α 6= 1
= 2pi−1 log |ξ| α = 1.
In what follows, gˆ(·;α, χ, kα, γ) is extended to any strictly positive α by
putting
gˆ(ξ;α, χ, kα, γ) = e
iχξ (ξ ∈ R, α > 2).
Fact 3.3. If µt is solution of (3) under (H1)-(H2), and if one of the conditions
(a)-(e) holds true, then µt converges, as t→ +∞, to a p.m. µ∞ having Fourier-
Stieltjes transform
µˆ∞(ξ) =
∫ +∞
0
gˆ(ξm1/(1−2λ); 1− 2λ, χ, k1−2λ, γ)ν1−2λ(dm) (ξ ∈ R)
where ν1−2λ is a uniquely determined p.m. on [0,+∞). Moreover, the function
gˆ has one of the following forms, depending on which condition (a)-(e) is met
by µ0 in Fact 3.2:
(a’) gˆ(ξ; 1− 2λ, χ, k1−2λ, γ) ≡ 1.
(b’) ′′ ≡ e−σ
2
0ξ
2/2.
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(c’) ′′ ≡ exp
{
− k1−2λ|ξ|
1−2λ
(
1− iγ
ξ
|ξ|
tan(pi(1 − 2λ)/2)
)}
.
(d’) ′′ ≡ exp
{
iχξ − k1|ξ|
}
.
(e’) ′′ ≡ exp
{
− k1−2λ|ξ|
1−2λ
(
1− iγ
ξ
|ξ|
tan(pi(1 − 2λ)/2)
)}
.
The values of k1−2λ and γ are given in Subsection 5.2, while ν1−2λ is identified
therein with the limiting law of a distinguished sequence of random numbers.
Remark 5. Conditions on τ under which µ∞ is just a stable law (that is,
ν1−2λ reduces to a unit mass at some point) are provided by Proposition 2 in
Bassetti et al. (2011). More precisely: If −1/2 ≤ λ < 1/2, then the limiting
p.m. µ∞ reduces to a stable law if and only if τ concentrates the entire mass on
{(x, y) ∈ [0,+∞)2 : x1−2λ + y1−2λ = 1}.
On the basis of rich empirical evidence of tails of observed income distribu-
tions, the most realistic forms ought to be those which satisfy conditions (e)
and (e’), under which the tails of µ∞ are of the same type as the ones of µ0.
This fact can be ascertained mathematically, even if it is impossible to obtain
explicit forms for mixtures µ∞.
Fact 3.4. Under (H1)-(H2), let µ∞ be the same p.m. as in Fact 3.3 and ν1−2λ
be non-degenerate. Then:
(i) If one of the conditions among (c)-(e) is in force and c1 · c2 > 0, then
lim
x→+∞
x1−2λµ∞((−∞,−x]) = c1 and lim
x→+∞
x1−2λµ∞((x,+∞)) = c2.
(ii) If one of the conditions among (c)-(e) is in force and c1 > 0, c2 = 0, then
lim
x→+∞
x1−2λµ∞((−∞,−x]) = c1 and µ∞((x,+∞)) = O
( 1
xp
)
as x→ +∞, for every positive p such that S(p) < 0.
(iii) If one of the conditions among (c)-(e) is in force and c1 = 0, c2 > 0, then
µ∞((−∞,−x]) = O
( 1
xp
)
and lim
x→+∞
x1−2λµ∞((x,+∞)) = c2
as x→ +∞, for every positive p such that S(p) < 0.
(iv) If (b) is in force and S admits only one zero, then
µ∞((−∞,−x]) = µ∞((x,+∞)) = o
( 1
xp
)
as x→ +∞, for every positive p.
(v) If (b) is in force and S admits two distinct zeros, say 1−2λ and l > 1−2λ,
then
µ∞((−∞,−x]) = µ∞((x,+∞)) ≥
M
2l1+δ
1
xl(log x)1+δ
for every positive δ, for sufficiently large x and a suitable constant M > 0.
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As a consequence, the economic situation corresponding to (e) turns out to
be conservation-oriented. Moreover, a natural question arises, wondering about
the limiting behaviour of the s-plus distribution when µ0 exhibits a higher of
lower level of inequality than the one prescribed by (e), i.e. if α takes a value
either smaller or greater than (1− 2λ).
Fact 3.5. In an economy satisfying (H1)-(H2) and (6), with relative r.a.i. λ
in (−1/2, 0), let the initial datum be a weak Pareto law of exponent α in (0, 2).
Then:
(i) The solution µt to (3) converges weakly to the point mass at zero if α >
1− 2λ (egalitarianism-oriented).
(ii) limt→+∞ µt((−a, a)) = 0 for every a > 0 if α < 1 − 2λ (inequality-
oriented).
A hint at the proof of this fact will be given in Subsection 5.3. The argument
used therein shows that the convergence to the point mass at zero, like in (i),
and the vague convergence to the null measure, like in (ii), occur also when λ
belongs to [0, 1/2), depending on whether the weak Pareto initial datum has
exponent α greater or smaller than 1− 2λ.
4. Economic implications
What actually characterizes a certain number of advanced economies is that the
level of inequality increases in time, so that the middle class, as a consequence
of Fact 3.5, might be hollowed out. Does the analysis, developed in previous
sections, suggest actions suitable for thwarting this process, generally seen as
highly negative? To answer, one must take note that, from Fact 3.5(ii) combined
with Fact 3.2 the process stems from conditions in which the concentration of
initial weak Pareto law is too high, w.r.t. to the given relative r.a.i., to be
preserved in time. Then, aiming at reversing the trend, in view of Fact 3.3 there
are two kinds of actions that can be taken either separately or jointly. After
fixing a bearable level of concentration, corresponding to a weak Pareto law of
exponent α0 one ought act with redistributive programs (social expenditure to
reduce poverty, highly progressive tax system, government policies such as the
increased access to higher education) to change the actual s-plus distribution
into a weak Pareto law of exponent α0 ≤ 1 − 2λ. Having done this, there are
the following two alternatives facing the political authority: First, α0 is equal
to (1− 2λ), λ being the actual relative r.a.i.. Second, α0 is strictly smaller than
(1 − 2λ). Under the former circumstance, no further measure has to be taken.
In the latter, more provisions are needed to modify the form of τ in order that,
as a result, the smallest zero of S coincide with α0. To this end, it is worth
recalling the well-known inequality∫ +∞
0
xpdF (x) = p
∫ +∞
0
xp−1(1− F (x))dx ≤ p
∫ +∞
0
xp−1(1−G(x))dx
=
∫ +∞
0
xpdG(x).
(9)
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valid for any p > 0 and any pair of p.d. functions F , G supported by [0,+∞)
and such that F (x) ≥ G(x) for every x. In fact, since one has to change the
relative r.a.i. in such a way that it may increase towards (1 − α0)/2, and since
p 7→ S(p) depends on the marginal p.d.’s of τ , (9) indicates that one has to
make sure that, as a consequence of the aforesaid provisions (e.g., to thwart any
phenomenon of rent seeking), the marginals increase pointwise, i.e., to make sure
that the agents content themselves with stochastically smaller l˜ and, especially,
with stochastically smaller r˜.
On the contrary, under the situation envisaged in Fact 3.5(i), the economy is
egalitarianism-oriented, so that it is reasonable to expect that such a situation
may encounter obstacles. A certain level of inequality could be inevitable: In
fact, in any economy, individuals who work harder and longer than others will
basically receive a reward for the energy they put into their work. Specularly
w.r.t. the inequality-oriented situation, one can obtain an increase of inequality
either by changing the actual µt into a weak Pareto law with exponent close to
(and not less than) a desired level α0, or by modifying the marginal p.d.’s of
τ in such a way that l˜ and r˜ become stochastically greater (i.e. the marginals
decrease poinwise). This last modification, reminiscent of the so-called “race to
the bottom” phenomenon, can be carried out, for example, by trying to weaken
business regulations.
In conclusion, the sense of the above considerations is that they lead to single
out specific actions in order to increase or diminish the inequality in the p.d.
of s-plus. On the one hand, one could act directly on the incomes by means of
transfers of money. On the other hand, one could act indirectly with actions
influencing on the form of τ with a view to changing the attitude of the agents
in front of risk.
5. Technical complements
This section gathers a number of comments and proofs necessary to complete,
mainly from a technical viewpoint, some of the arguments developed in previous
sections.
5.1. On the concentration function of weak Pareto laws
This subsection supplies the proofs of the statements concerning the Lorenz
curve of a weak Pareto law, situated in Section 2.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Let µαi be any of the two laws considered in the word-
ing of the proposition. Then,
lim
x→+∞
xαi
(
1−Aµαi (x)
)
= c+i + c
−
i
and, hence, for every positive ε there is a positive x¯i such that
1−
c+i + c
−
i + ε
xαi
≤ Aµαi (x) ≤ 1−
c+i + c
−
i − ε
xαi
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holds true for every x ≥ x¯i. Thus, one can immediately obtain that the inequal-
ities (c+i + c−i − ε
1− θ
)1/αi
≤ A−1µαi
(θ) ≤
(c+i + c−i + ε
1− θ
)1/αi
are valid for every θ > θ¯i , with θ¯i := 1− (c
+
i + c
−
i − ε)/x¯
αi
i . Whence, since
ϕµαi (θ) =
1
M(Aµαi )
∫ θ
0
A−1µαi (t)dt = 1−
1
M(Aµαi )
∫ 1
θ
A−1µαi (t)dt,
from the above inequalities one deduces that
1−
1
M(Aµαi )
αi(c
+
i + c
−
i + ε)
1/αi
αi − 1
(1− θ)1−1/αi
≤ ϕµαi (θ) ≤ 1−
1
M(Aµαi )
αi(c
+
i + c
−
i − ε)
1/αi
αi − 1
(1− θ)1−1/αi
is valid for every θ > θ¯i. Then, to complete the proof, it is enough to verify that
1−
1
M(Aµα1 )
α1(c
+
1 + c
−
1 − ε)
1/α1
α1 − 1
(1− θ)1−1/α1
≤ 1−
1
M(Aµα2 )
α2(c
+
2 + c
−
2 + ε)
1/α2
α2 − 1
(1 − θ)1−1/α2
holds for every θ < θ < 1, with
θ := max
{
1−
[M(Aµα2 )
M(Aµα1 )
(c+1 + c
−
1 − ε)
1/α1
(c+2 + c
−
2 + ε)
1/α2
α1(α2 − 1)
α2(α1 − 1)
]α1α2/(α2−α1)
, θ¯1, θ¯2
}
.
Proof of Fact 2.2. The proof is obtained by showing that the concentration func-
tion ϕ
F
(ω)
α
associated with the p.d. function A(ω)Fα , introduced immediately before
the statement of Fact 2.2, converges pointwise to zero in (0, 1), as ω goes to +∞.
First, notice that limx→+∞ xα(1−AFα(x)) exists and is equal to a positive num-
ber, say l. Thus, for every ε > 0, there is a positive x¯ such that
1−
l + ε
xα
≤ AFα(x) ≤ 1−
l − ε
xα
(10)
holds true for every x > x¯, and so, assuming that ω is large enough to be strictly
greater than x¯, it is immediate to check that the inequalities
( l − ε
1− θAFα(ω)
)1/α
≤ (A
(ω)
Fα
)−1(θ) ≤
( l + ε
1− θAFα(ω)
)1/α
(11)
are met at each θ > θ¯ := (1 − (l − ε)x¯−α)/AFα(ω). The proof proceeds by
separating the case in which α < 1 from the one of α = 1.
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If α < 1 and θ > θ¯, (11) entails
ϕ
F
(ω)
α
(θ) = 1−
1
M(A
(ω)
Fα
)
∫ 1
θ
(A
(ω)
Fα
)−1(t)dt
≤ 1−
α(l − ε)1/α
M(A
(ω)
Fα
)(1− α)AFα (ω)
[(
1−AFα(ω)
)
)1−1/α
−
(
1− θAFα(ω)
)
)1−1/α
]
.
At this stage, from (10) and straightforward computations, one can bound
M(A
(ω)
Fα
) according to
M(A
(ω)
Fα
) =
(∫ x¯
0
+
∫ ω
x¯
)
(1−A
(ω)
Fα1
(x))dx ≤ K + ω1−α
α(l + ε) + 2ε(1− α)
(1− α)AFα (ω)
where K is a suitable constant. Therefore, combination of this bound with (10)
concludes the proof, when α < 1, since, for every θ > θ¯,
lim
ω→+∞
ϕ
F
(ω)
α
(θ) ≤ lim
ω→+∞
[
1−
(l − ε)1/α
2ε+ α(l + ε)/(1− α)
α
1− α
(
(l + ε)1−1/α
− ωα−1(1− θAFα(ω))
1−1/α
)]
= 1−
( l − ε
l + ε
)1/α 1
1 + 2ε(1− α)/(l + ε)
is positive and arbitrarily small in view of the arbitrariness of ε.
If α = 1 and θ > θ¯, one can argue as in the case α < 1 to obtain
ϕ
F
(ω)
1
(θ) ≤ 1−
1
M(A
(ω)
F1
)
∫ 1
θ
(l − ε)(1 − tAF1(ω))
−1dt
1−
l − ε
M(A
(ω)
F1
)AF1(ω)
[
log(1− θAF1(ω))− log(1−AF1(ω))
]
and, mimicking−mutatis mutandis − the same computations to boundM(A(ω)F1 ),
one easily gets
lim
ω→+∞
ϕ
F
(ω)
1
(θ) ≤ 1−
l − ε
l + ε
completing the proof in view of the arbitrariness of ε.
Given useful information on the concentration of weak Pareto laws, we pro-
ceed with the description of a probabilistic representation of µt evoked in some
passages in the previous sections.
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5.2. Comments on (and consequences of) a well-known probabilistic
representation of the solution µt
As recalled in Section 2.1 in Bassetti et al. (2011), the Fourier-Stieltjes transform
of the solution µt to (3) can be expressed as
µˆt(ξ) =
∑
n≥1
e−t(1− e−t)n−1qˆn(ξ, ϕ0)
where qˆ1(ξ;ϕ) := µˆ0(ξ) and, for every n ≥ 2,
qˆn(ξ;ϕ) :=
1
n− 1
n−1∑
j=1
∫
[0,+∞)2
qˆj(lξ)qˆn−j(rξ)τ(dldr). (12)
In view of an argument explained therein, and which, in its turn, draws on
previous papers McKean (1966), Gabetta and Regazzini (2006), one verifies
that µt is the p.d. of a random number
Vt :=
ν˜t∑
j=1
β˜j,ν˜tXj
for every t > 0, where ν˜t, β˜j,ν˜t and Xj (j = 1, 2, . . . ) are random elements
defined on a sufficiently large measurable space (Ω,F), endowed with a suitable
p.m. P according to which:
• ν˜ := (ν˜t)t≥0 is an integer-valued stochastic process such that
P{ν˜t = n} = e
−t(1− e−t)n−1 (n = 1, 2, . . . )
for every t > 0.
• X˜ := (Xj)j≥1 is a sequence of i.i.d. random numbers with common p.d.
µ0.
• β˜ := (β˜j,n : j = 1, . . . , n)n≥1 is a triangular array recursively defined by
β˜1,1 = 1
(β˜1,n+1, . . . , β˜n+1,n+1) = (β˜1,n, . . . , β˜i˜n−1,n, β˜i˜n,n l˜n, β˜i˜n,nr˜n,
β˜i˜n+1,n, . . . , β˜n,n) (n ≥ 1)
(13)
where i˜ := (˜in)n≥1 is a sequence of independent integer-valued random
numbers, each i˜n being uniformly distributed on {1, . . . , n}, and (l˜, r˜) =
((l˜n, r˜n))n≥1 is a sequence of i.i.d. random vectors with τ as common p.d..
• {ν˜, X˜, i˜, (l˜, r˜)} forms an independency w.r.t. P.
Whence, µt turns out to be the law of a weighted sum, with random weights, of
i.i.d. random numbers. This fact is conducive to studying the limiting behaviour
of µt, as t → +∞, from the point of view of the central limit theorem of
probability theory. In point of fact, what it happens is that, roughly speaking,
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the conditional p.d. of Vt, given β˜, converges weakly to a stable law of exponent
(1− 2λ) characterized by Fourier transform
R ∋ ξ 7→ gˆ(ξ(M (1−2λ)∞ )
1/(1−2λ); 1− 2λ, χ, k1−2λ, γ)
where M (1−2λ)∞ is a random number whose p.d. is the same ν1−2λ as in Facts
3.3 and 3.4. The reader is referred to Bassetti et al. (2011) for the proof of this
statement. It is worth noticing that, in view of Proposition 2 therein, if (1− 2λ)
were the greatest of two distinct roots of S(p) = 0, then ν1−2λ would coincide
with the unit mass at zero, which explains the motivation for the adoption of
(H2) in Subsection 1.
For the sake of definiteness, we recall that the parameters k1−2λ and γ, ap-
pearing in the expression of the transform gˆ introduced in Fact 3.3, are related
to the constants c1 and c2 in (4) through
k1−2λ =
(c1 + c2)pi
2Γ(1− 2λ) sin(pi(1 − 2λ)/2)
, γ = I{c1+c2>0}
c2 − c1
c1 + c2
.
The section concludes with a couple of proofs previously omitted for not
interrupting the line of reasoning.
5.3. Proof of Facts 3.1 and 3.5
Proof of Fact 3.1. It is obvious that any steady state is also a limiting p.d. for µt,
as t→ +∞. To prove the vice versa, split the summands in the expression of Vt
into two classes: the former containing those with l˜1 in the respective coefficient
β˜j , the latter including the remaining summands. Then Vt = l˜1Vt,l + r˜1Vt,r
where Vt,l [Vt,r, respectively] denotes the sum of the β˜j,ν˜tXj/l˜1 [β˜j,ν˜tXj/r˜1,
respectively] associated with the summands in the first [second, respectively]
class. It is an easy fact that if Vt converges in distribution, then, conditionally
on (l˜1, r˜1), also Vt,l and Vt,r converge in distribution and the three limiting laws
must coincide. Thus, denoting this common law by µ∞, one gets µ∞ = Q+(µ∞),
where Q+ is the same operator as in (3), stating that µ∞ is a fixed point of such
an operator or, equivalently, that µ∞ is a steady state.
Proof of Fact 3.5. As far as (i) is concerned, it follows from the assumptions
combined with the part of Fact 3.3 concerning the case in which c1 = c2 = 0.
To deal with point (ii), for the sake of expository clarity, introduce the space
D :=
(
[0,+∞)
)3
× R×
(
[0, 1]
)2
× [0, 1]
together with its coordinate variables
(Z,Z1, Z2), Sα, (l˜, r˜), U.
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Moreover, let Pr be a p.m. on the Borel subsets B(D) of D which makes the
coordinates stochastically independent and having the following additional dis-
tributional properties:
(i1) Z,Z1, Z2 are i.i.d. non-negative random numbers having mean equal to 1
(i2) Sα has a non-degenerate stable law of exponent α
(i3) (l˜, r˜) is a random vector distributed according to τ
(i4) U is a random number uniformly distributed on (0, 1)
(i5) the p.d. of Z is the same that the one of US(α)(l˜αZ1 + r˜αZ2).
Then, defining G∞ to be the p.d. function of SαZ1/α, one can use Theorem 2.2 in
Bassetti and Ladelli (2012) to state that Gt(x) := µt(−∞, xetS(α)/α]→ G∞(x),
as t→ +∞, at each continuity point x of G∞. Therefore, for every a > 0,
µt((−a, a]) = Gt(ae
−tS(α)/a)−Gt(−ae
−tS(α)/a) ≤ Gt(ε)−Gt(−ε− 0)
holds true for every ε > 0 whenever t ≥ (α/S(α)) log(a/ε) ∨ 0. Moreover,
lim sup
t→+∞
[Gt(ε)−Gt(−ε− 0)] ≤ G∞(ε)−G∞(−ε− 0)
and hence
lim sup
t→+∞
µt((−a, a)) ≤ Pr{SαZ
1/α = 0}. (14)
Since every non-degenerate stable law is absolutely continuous, the probability
of {SαZ1/α = 0} is equal to the probability of {Z = 0}. Now, from (i5), it
follows that
Pr{Z = 0} = Pr{l˜αZ1 + r˜
αZ2 = 0}.
Since Pr{l˜ = 0} = Pr{r˜ = 0} = 0 from (6), and Z1 and Z2 are non-negative
random numbers, one can write Pr{l˜αZ1 + r˜αZ2 = 0} = Pr{Z1 = 0, Z2 = 0},
and then, combination of the previous equalities with (i1) entails
Pr{Z = 0} = Pr{Z = 0}2
and Pr{Z = 0} = 0 since Z has mean equal to 1. At this stage, to complete the
proof, it is enough to recall (14).
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